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Abstract  
 
The policy of the European Union (EU) towards Taiwan has mostly been analysed 
either as a by-product of EU-China relations or with reference to the general lack of 
a European geopolitical approach towards East Asia. By adopting a lobbying 
approach which focusses on Taiwan’s different ‘channels of influence’ within the 
complex European foreign policy system in Brussels, this study provides new insights 
into the functioning of EU-Taiwan relations. It also sheds new light on the implications 
of the radical change in Taiwanese diplomacy after 2008, when Chen Shui-bian’s 
assertive and identity-based diplomacy was replaced with the Kuomintang’s new 
dogma of ‘workable diplomacy’.  
Based on semi-guided interviews with Taiwanese and European actors, this paper 
examines why Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels, albeit very active and professional, is 
not salient enough to meet the challenges arising from the overwhelming Chinese 
competition and from the increasing proliferation of regional trade agreements – 
with active EU participation – in the Asia-Pacific region. It argues that the pragmatic 
‘workable diplomacy’ approach, while smoothing out working-level relations 
between Taiwan and the EU, fails to attract a sufficient degree of political and public 
attention in Europe to the Taiwan question and thus fosters the neglect of Taiwan by 
European foreign policy-makers. The main challenge faced by Taiwanese 
diplomacy, however, is not simply one of convincing through technical arguments, 
but one of agenda setting, that is, of redefining European priorities in Taiwan’s 
favour. 
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Introduction 
 
Both the European Union and Taiwan can be regarded as ‘special cases’ in 
international relations, with debates and uncertainty over their recognition and 
actorness. Taiwan, having progressively lost international recognition and facing an 
ever more powerful People’s Republic of China (PRC) which prevents it from (re-) 
establishing official diplomatic relations, has been compelled to find alternative ways 
to seek support from, and influence on, European foreign policy actors.1 Albeit in a 
different fashion, the EU has equally challenged traditional, sovereignty-based 
concepts of International Relations (IR). While being significantly different from the 
sum of its member states’ national foreign policies, EU foreign policy is “neither 
exclusive nor all-encompassing”2 and also defies realist conceptions of state 
behaviour in many other regards. Analysing the bilateral relationship between these 
two peculiar international actors thus requires going beyond traditional IR concepts 
and exploring new methods to understand Taiwan’s relevance (or irrelevance) for 
European foreign policy-making. 
The present paper sets out to fill the gap between theoretical discussions of the 
EU’s potential role in EU-Taiwan relations and empirical IR scholarship, which simply 
explains the lack of actual EU engagement through structural constraints.3 Instead, 
this study examines why Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels is not salient enough to meet 
the challenges arising from the overwhelming Chinese competition and the 
proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTA) in the Asia-Pacific region. It does so 
by adopting a lobbying approach4 that is sensitive to the specific ways in which 
1 J. Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 8. 
2 S. Keukeleire & T. Delreux, The foreign policy of the European Union, New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014, 2nd edn., p. 14. 
3 S. Hu, “Structural Constraints on the EU's Role in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations”, European 
Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 2011, pp. 37-58; J. Cabestan, “The Taiwan Issue in 
Europe-China Relations: An Irritant more than Leverage”, in D. Shambaugh, E. Sandschneider 
& H. Zhou (eds.), China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies, and Prospects, London, 
Routledge, 2007, pp. 84-101. 
4 A distinction has to be made between official diplomacy, following codified rules and 
symbols, and other means of influencing political decision-making, generally referred to as 
‘lobbying’ (J. Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 15, 95). While the conduct of EU-Taiwan relations 
certainly includes many elements that could be described as ‘diplomacy’, they are not 
officially characterised as such and tend to avoid all appearances of formal diplomatic 
conduct. As formal diplomatic recognition for Taiwanese representatives is not even on the 
agenda of EU-Taiwan relations, I refer to all activities geared towards promoting Taiwanese 
views and interests in Europe as ‘lobbying’. 
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Taiwanese interests are articulated and promoted vis-à-vis European foreign policy 
makers. To this end, Taiwan’s different channels of influence in Europe – including 
unofficial diplomatic relations with institutional actors as well as alternative channels 
such as the media, civil society and academic discourse, will be examined.5 
The conventional wisdom about EU-Taiwan relations is that they are mainly 
economic in nature,6 while “political extensions” remain purely functional and 
subordinated to the maximisation of trade benefits.7 Following the above-mentioned 
examination of Taiwanese ‘channels of influence’,8 the most pressing economic issue 
in EU-Taiwan relations will thus serve to illustrate in how far Taiwanese lobbying today 
is prepared to face the relentlessly growing competition from China and make its 
own demands heard among decision makers in Brussels: the question of an 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA) between the EU and Taiwan, which Taipei 
has been angling for since the EU abandoned its multilateralist ‘Lamy doctrine’9 in 
favour of RTAs with many of Taiwan’s fiercest economic competitors. In combination 
with the analysis of Taiwan’s channels of influence in Europe, this case study will also 
serve to examine how the Kuomintang’s (KMT) return to power in 2008 and the 
ensuing shift towards a much more China-friendly policy as well as the new credo of 
“workable diplomacy”,10 have influenced the relevance and success of Taiwanese 
lobbying in Brussels. Finally, these new insights will also feed in to the debate over a 
5 The primary goal is not to measure the amount of influence, but to understand the 
mechanisms by which an actor tries to incentivise another actor or exercise influence on their 
positions and decisions. Channels of influence can include institutionalised exchange, 
personal relations, or media contacts useful for influencing domestic discourses which in turn 
can be expected to have an impact on policies. C. Mahoney, “Lobbying success in the 
United States and the European Union”, Journal of Public Policy, vol. 27, no. 2, 2007, pp. 35-56. 
6 C. Dent & D. Johnson, “Taiwan-EU Economic Relations. A European Perspective”, 
EurAmerica, vol. 30, no. 1, 2000, pp. 109-157. 
7 F. Mengin, “A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to Europe-Taiwan Economic Ties”, 
The China Quarterly, vol. 169, 2002, pp. 136-153. 
8 The conceptual reliance on channels of influence in this analysis is based on the assumption 
that decision-making in EU foreign policy is highly decentralised and takes place as an 
aggregating process of opinions at different stages and levels, which is why a number of 
different entry points are necessary to obtain significant results. Keukeleire & Delreux, op.cit., 
p. 18. 
9 G. Glania & J. Matthes, Multilateralism Or Regionalism?: Trade Policy Options for the 
European Union, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005, p. 2. 
10 This term has been coined by Su Hungdah to describe president Ma Ying Jeou’s diplomatic 
about-face from politicising the ‘Taiwan question’ to focussing purely on pragmatic, mostly 
economic issues. H. Su, “Taiwan’s Strategy towards the EU: From Hallstein Doctrine to 
Workable Diplomacy”, in H. Su (ed.), Asian Countries’ Strategies towards the European Union 
in an Inter-regionalist Context, Taipei, National Taiwan University Press, 2015, p. 108. 
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potentially more strategic European approach to the ‘Taiwan question’, as well as 
possible implications of a further Europeanisation of foreign policy in this domain. 
Naturally, conducting field research into the less formalised aspects of EU-Taiwan 
relations in Brussels, beyond official statements and policy documents, brings about 
its own hurdles, as the large gap between official parlance and day-to-day 
practices makes EU-Taiwan relations a very sensitive topic to discuss frankly for both 
politicians and civil servants. The sensitiveness of the ‘Taiwan issue’ also meant that 
interviewees preferred to stay anonymous. In view of these problems, the 
methodological challenge has been to assemble the pieces of partial information 
from different sides and combine them with structural analysis of the EU-Taiwan 
relationship based on existing research and publicly available information. 
After a brief outline of the geopolitical context of contemporary EU-Taiwan 
relations, this paper will turn to a thorough examination of Taiwan’s channels of 
influence within the EU’s foreign policy system, encompassing both the EU institutions 
and non-institutional actors. The last section will address the KMT’s economistic 
approach to EU-Taiwan relations in a broader context, paying particular attention to 
the hidden geopolitics behind the EU’s RTA strategy and the potential for a different 
EU Taiwan policy within the current geopolitical framework in East Asia. 
Changing parameters for EU-Taiwan relations in the 21st century 
Since its expulsion from the United Nations in 1971, the Republic of China on Taiwan’s 
international status has been in constant decline. Even more daunting than the 
progressive loss of its last formal diplomatic allies, however, is the recent global turn 
to trade regionalism which threatens to undermine Taipei’s major diplomatic 
achievement of becoming a full member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – 
albeit under the Beijing-imposed name of ‘Chinese Taipei’ – in 2002. The proliferation 
of RTAs, allowed as exceptions to the most-favoured nation treatment under WTO 
law, poses a huge challenge to Taiwan as an economic and diplomatic entity, 
particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.11 Taiwan is highly dependent on international 
trade and tightening its grip over the island is an integral part of China’s political 
‘grand strategy’: 
11 M. Kawai & G. Wignaraja, ”Multilateralizing regional trade arrangements in Asia”, in R. 
Baldwin & P. Low (eds.), Multilateralizing Regionalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2009, p. 501. 
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None of these agreements includes Chinese Taipei, and in fact they all 
discriminate against Chinese Taipei. The US-Republic of Korea FTA [Free Trade 
Agreement] will likely cause significant trade diversion away from Chinese Taipei 
exports [...] That may not be a big economic problem for everyone else, but does 
raise important political questions.12 
Concerning Taiwan’s number one foreign policy goal of safeguarding its national 
security vis-à-vis the ‘China threat’, Europe may be virtually irrelevant. Not only does 
the EU itself have no security strategy or even noteworthy military presence in East 
Asia, but European states have also all but renounced any major arms deals with 
Taiwan out of fear of vexing China.13 But the above-mentioned important political 
questions raised by trade regionalism in East Asia also concern the EU, which indeed 
had long upheld its traditional commitment to WTO multilateralism even against the 
aggressive US competitive liberalisation strategy. However, the EU has become a 
very active player in trade regionalism since the Commission’s 2006 Global Europe 
strategy, notably through comprehensive FTAs with South Korea (2011), Singapore 
(2013) and Vietnam (2015).  
With regard to Taiwan’s continuing exclusion from these deals,14 numerous critics 
in the United States, spurred by a very active pro-Taiwan lobby, are already 
brandishing the looming prospect of an internationally isolated Taiwan left with no 
other choice but to turn further towards China for economic rescue. In Europe, 
however, these questions are treated exclusively from a commercial perspective.15 
Thus, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) concluded 
between Taipei and Beijing in 2010 tends to be superficially attributed to the 
returning KMT government’s generally China-friendly positions. Looking at it from the 
Chinese side, however, it is but one step in a broader strategy of bringing the 
‘renegade province’ of Taiwan under Beijing’s influence in a peaceful and 
12 G. Hufbauer & J. Schott, “Fitting Asia-Pacific agreements into the WTO system”, in Baldwin & 
Low, op.cit., p. 622. 
13 O. Bräuner, “How Europe Shies from Taiwan”, The Diplomat, 20 March 2012. 
14 Taipei’s main concern are the plurilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, from 
which it continues to be excluded despite its 2013 membership bid. As for other aspects of 
Taiwan’s foreign policy, the EU only comes in second as a trading partner behind the United 
States, which continues to be Taiwan’s international ‘guardian angel’. 
15 Even in the case of the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), arguably the only agreement 
where Taiwan is one step ahead of China, the EU has already pronounced itself in favour of 
the PRC’s participation, thereby indicating its unwillingness to give any privileges to Taiwan 
vis-à-vis China. European External Action Service, “EU backs China joining talks on TiSA”, 31 
March 2014. 
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incremental manner. China’s “RTA shopping spree”,16 resulting in privileged 
economic relations with many of Taiwan’s former allies, and the generous 
concessions offered to Hong Kong and Macao in similar agreements, are strategic 
moves “to lure Chinese Taipei into the game”.17 Taiwan’s growing political and 
economic dependency on Beijing is thus a direct consequence of the RTA 
proliferation among Taipei’s partners and adversaries since the 2000s. The next 
section will examine how Taiwan struggles to remain relevant and make its voice 
heard in Brussels despite the EU’s choice to actively take part in this RTA race and to 
prioritise smooth economic relations with China over other concerns. 
Taiwanese channels of influence within the EU’s foreign policy system 
Whereas the US remains the paramount foreign policy priority for Taipei, intensifying 
relations with Europe has become another important goal of Taiwanese 
diplomacy.18 Although a European foreign policy has long been missing, the EU level 
has significantly gained relevance since the 1990s and both China and Taiwan 
started to develop specific ‘Europe strategies’ to intensify institutional links and 
obtain Brussels’ support on vital questions in East Asia.19  
The Taiwanese lobbying system in Europe today largely corresponds with the 
exigencies of the EU’s ‘multi-location’ foreign policy system.20 One assistant in the 
European Parliament (EP) highlighted the admiringly good coordination between 
the Taipei Representative Office (TRO) in Brussels and national-level TROs in major 
European capitals, recalling for instance that Taiwanese diplomats in Brussels were 
perfectly informed of former engagements with Taiwan of Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) at the national level.21 The staffing of different TROs in Europe 
equally reflects the predominant importance of the EU level for Taiwan today, with 
the TRO in Brussels being significantly larger than representations in national capitals 
16 H. Gao, “The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit”, in R. Buckley et al. (eds.), Challenges To 
Multilateral Trade: The Impact of Bilateral, Preferential and Regional Agreements, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2008, p. 56. 
17 Ibid., p. 59. 
18 Su, op. cit., pp. 94-98. 
19 N. Noesselt, Die Beziehungen der EU zu China und Taiwan: Hintergründe und Perzeptionen, 
Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2008. pp. 57-60, 137. 
20 H. Wallace, “An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes”, in H. Wallace et al. (eds.), 
Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 78. 
21 Interview with a parliamentary assistant, European Parliament, Brussels, 20 April 2015. 
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and staffed with seasoned diplomats and important figures of Taiwanese politics.22 
More generally, Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels is described by European actors and 
observers as very active and more adapted to European cultural susceptibility than 
mainland Chinese diplomacy: 
Taiwan is very open, they have a different mentality than the Chinese, we see 
them as closer to us Europeans […] the Taiwanese are also very, very active, they 
are one of the most active embassies in the Parliament.23 
The creation of the European Economic and Trade Office (EETO) in Taipei has further 
raised the EU’s profile among Taiwanese foreign policy-makers and also provided EU 
decision-makers with better expertise on Taiwan.24 The EETO’s relations with EEAS 
headquarters in Brussels can in fact be assimilated to those of official EU Delegations 
abroad, including regular coordination on political and diplomatic issues despite 
their absence from official EETO organigrams. 25 
However, Taiwan’s relevance for the EU is dwindling as China’s influence surges. 
Furthermore, the subtle improvement in Europe’s diplomatic treatment of Taiwan 
after establishing the EETO26 was more than offset by tensions during the late phase 
of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rule (2006-2008). The European exasperation 
over Taiwan’s provocativeness is another reason why the Commission stopped 
taking sides on cross-Strait issues and shifted towards “two-sided admonition”.27 
 EU member states and Council positions: growing neglect of Taiwan 
In light of the 21st century’s new balance of power, it is clear that no single European 
country remains powerful enough to even cautiously stand up to Beijing on a 
question as sensitive as the Taiwan issue: “No political upgrading of German-
22 The best example for this is David Lin (林永樂), who was Taiwan’s representative to the EU 
from 2010 before being directly promoted to the office of foreign minister in 2012. This 
contrasts notably with the many junior diplomats in China’s mission to the EU and reflects the 
more limited importance attributed to supranational institutions by the PRC. 
23 Interview with a parliamentary assistant, European Parliament (INTA Committee), via 
telephone, 27 March 2015. 
24 S. Winkler, A Question of Sovereignty? The EU’s Policy on Taiwan’s Participation in 
International Organizations, PhD Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, July 2011, p. 2. 
25 Interview with an EEAS official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 27 March 2015. 
26 S. Tang, “Die Taiwanpolitik der EU - Beschränkungen und Chancen”, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, no. 49, 2006, p. 35. 
27 Noesselt, op.cit., p. 72. 
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Taiwanese relations without a strong European backing”.28 This assertion is all the 
more true today, with the ‘China factor’29 being more relevant than ever and 
Taiwan’s international standing in progressive decline. In view of these new realities, 
simply lobbying individual member states on issues of ‘high politics’ has ceased to be 
a promising strategy for the Taiwanese government. European capitals do, however, 
remain important lobbying sites both because of the relevance of lower-level 
commercial dealings, and – more importantly – because their positions are key to EU-
level decision-making in the Council. 
In principle, the Council’s 2007 ‘Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security 
Policy in East Asia’30, which for the first time list the “dispute across the Taiwan Strait” 
as one of three major “threats to regional security [having] a direct bearing on the 
interests of the EU” in East Asia,31 suggest the gradual evolution of a properly 
European position on the Taiwan question. Concerning many of Taiwan’s core 
interests, however, the Council’s position is now much more cautious than it was in 
the late 1990s, when it openly condemned Chinese meddling with Taiwanese 
elections.32 As meetings in the Council are confidential, China should in principle not 
be able to attribute consensus-based decisions to one or several countries. 
Nonetheless, most official Council positions fail to go beyond a “lowest common 
denominator” of individual national interests.33 The fact that Member States are 
mostly unable to use their potential common strength to adopt a more vigorous 
position vis-à-vis China also explains the many diplomatic taboos in the EU’s Taiwan 
policy. Besides, the PRC’s overwhelming economic importance has flattened out 
intra-European differences as even formerly Taiwan-friendly countries such as the 
Czech Republic, Latvia or the Netherlands have aligned their positions with Beijing’s 
demands34 and even cautious initiatives by the European Commission or the EEAS 
28 G. Schubert, “The European Dimension of German-Taiwanese Relations: A Critical 
Assessment”, China aktuell, vol. 30, no. 9, 2011, p. 989. 
29 R. Solomon (ed.), The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene, 
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1981. 
30 Council of the European Union, “Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East 
Asia”, Brussels, 20 December 2007. 
31 Ibid., p. 2. 
32 S. Tang, “The European Union and the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait (1996-2009): A Content 
Analysis”, Issues & Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 2010, p. 64. 
33 Cabestan, op.cit., pp. 96-97. 
34 E. Sandschneider, “China’s Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe”, The China 
Quarterly, vol. 169, 2002, p. 34. 
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are now met with suspicion.35 Slight differences only come to the fore on rare 
occasions, for instance when France and Cyprus were the last countries to oppose 
the EU-Taiwan visa waiver agreement in 2010.36 Strong competition for a ‘special 
relationship’ with China has also repeatedly driven France and Germany to play 
particularly hard on Taiwan.37 As in other aspects of EU-China relations, supranational 
actors can do little against such national attempts to please the Chinese juggernaut, 
which is why such issues do not tend to play an important role in Brussels. 
In any case, the Council itself cannot be regarded as a primary channel of 
influence for Taiwan, given that any official relations at ministerial level are 
precluded and the Council is generally not considered a worthwhile target for direct 
lobbying efforts even at lower levels.38 However, as the persistent opposition to the 
visa waiver agreement has shown, the Council’s unanimity rule in foreign policy often 
makes it the hardest obstacle to overcome in critical moments. 
 The European Commission and the EEAS: business first 
While being “largely side-lined in the CFSP [Common Foreign and Security Policy] 
and CSDP [Common Security and Defence Policy]”, the European Commission still 
has a critical role to play in EU foreign policy, notably in “defining, defending, 
promoting and representing the common interests in the EU’s external action”.39 Of 
the four Directorates-General (DG) directly involved in European foreign policy 
today,40 DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations is irrelevant for Taiwan 
for obvious reasons; DG International Cooperation and Development is only 
marginally involved in one project aiming towards the abolition of the death penalty 
and the improvement of Taiwan’s judicial system; DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection mainly deals with Taiwan on a technical level (in case of typhoons etc.), 
or through Taiwan’s most important humanitarian donor organisation, the Buddhist 
Tzu Chi Foundation. The latter can be seen as a well-established tool of Taiwan’s 
35 EEAS official (Interview 3). 
36 Su, op. cit., p. 108. 
37 M. Mattlin, “A Normative EU Policy towards China: Mission Impossible?”, Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, FIIA Occasional Paper, no. 67, Helsinki, 2010, p. 11. 
38 Whereas approaching permanent representatives in Brussels may be a winning strategy for 
business lobbyists on more technical issues, the political sensitivity of most Taiwanese 
demands also excludes this alternative pathway. 
39 Keukeleire & Delreux, op.cit., p. 72. 
40 Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
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‘track-two diplomacy’, which is geared towards cultivating quasi-diplomatic links 
abroad with the help of non-governmental actors.41 
The by far most relevant role, therefore, is played by DG Trade, which is also the 
DG enjoying most leeway in external affairs vis-à-vis member states. In a sense, the 
official conduct of trade relations with the EU is by itself an important achievement of 
Taiwanese lobbying, which was only made possible by Taiwan’s WTO accession in 
2001.42 Besides, however, the Commission has scrupulously stuck to the official 
European diplomatic line and made little effort to upgrade relations with Taiwan any 
further. 
Since its establishment in 2010, the EEAS has stayed in line with the position of its 
predecessor DG External Relations on EU-Taiwan relations. The EEAS and DG Trade 
work hand in hand as “two legs of cooperation on the European side”,43 which 
means that they continue to follow rather a division by topic (trade vs. all other 
issues) than pursuing any substantially different approaches. Moreover, Taiwanese 
diplomats make no real distinction between the two institutions, as the TRO is 
generally organised by policy fields – with the noteworthy exception of its ‘European 
Parliament division,’ where three diplomats focus solely on lobbying parliamentarians 
and their assistants.44 
An EEAS official describes Taiwanese lobbying in the Commission/EEAS as “very 
sophisticated” yet “very pushy”, including almost daily phone calls from the TRO and 
regular “invitations to lunch, dinner, small gifts, all these sorts of things”.45 Taiwanese 
lobbying also includes regular invitations for Commission/EEAS officials to visit Taiwan. 
This ’invitation diplomacy’ is mainly aimed at raising Taiwan’s general profile and 
appreciation of its cultural and political distinctiveness, rather than being directly 
related to the promotion of specific issues. Given that meetings at the political level 
are excluded, high-level officials’ (up to the EEAS Secretary General) meetings with 
Taiwanese representatives are of particular importance. 
41 B. Lang, “Off the beaten track: Taiwan's changing 'track-two diplomacy' after 
democratisation – and its pitfalls”, College of Europe Essay, academia.edu, 11/2014. 
42 P. Lim, “The European Union’s Economic Ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan)”, in G. 
Wiessala, J.F. Wilson & P. Taneja (eds.), The European Union and China: Interests and 
Dilemmas, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2009, p. 203. 
43 EEAS official (Interview 3). 
44 Based on own investigations at the TRO in Brussels and different interviews. 
45 EEAS official (Interview 3). 
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In sum, working relations between the Commission/EEAS and Taiwanese 
diplomats are well established. Although the Taiwanese, who remain clearly on the 
demanding side, are confronted with a favourably disposed – yet relatively passive – 
European administration, the EU does not seem inclined to take any pro-Taiwan 
initiatives in the continuing “absence of significant pressure from domestic 
constituencies or external allies”.46 Schucher’s bottom line that “Brussels has taken a 
hands-off approach to the questions of stability and security in the Taiwan Strait […] 
and is still just talking business”47 still holds true in most regards. 
 The European Parliament: Taiwan’s remaining friend in Europe? 
In stark contrast to other EU institutions’ extremely cautious stance on the Taiwan 
question, the EP has long been playing the role of Taiwan’s ‘best friend’ in Europe. 
Starting with the 1985 Resolution on Trade with Taiwan, it adopted numerous Taiwan-
friendly resolutions over the last three decades.48 Without questioning the EU’s One-
China policy, MEPs are thus trying to fully exploit the wiggle room that this policy 
allows for, notably by consistently taking sides with Taiwan over Chinese military 
threats and worrying armament in the Taiwan Strait.49 
An obvious downside to this well-established channel of influence is the non-
binding nature of EP resolutions in foreign policy. Lan Yuchun, despite quipping that 
the “EP’s resolutions have no effect other than upsetting Beijing”50, still identifies some 
secondary effects, namely asserting the EU’s moral position in international politics 
against the other EU institutions’ realpolitik, formulating potential alternatives to the 
“official EU policy” and functioning as a “multiplier of public opinion”, which he 
supposes to be in favour of Taiwan’s cause.51 And whereas institutionally “the 
Council routinely ignored the EP’s resolutions on Taiwan”,52 the “main advantage of 
the EP is to have direct and informal contacts with the Commission, [to] raise 
46 Y. Lan, “The European Parliament and the China–Taiwan Issue: An Empirical Approach”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 2004, p. 127. 
47 G. Schucher, “Old Hat, New Rhetoric: The EU’s Policy toward Taiwan after the Fifth 
Enlargement”, Issues & Studies, vol. 43, no. 3, 2007, p. 41. 
48 C. Tubilewicz, “Europe in Taiwan’s Post–Cold War Foreign Relations”, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, vol. 18, no. 2, 2007, p. 428. 
49 European Parliament, Resolution of 14 March 2013 on EU-China relations (2012/2137(INI)), 
P7_TA(2013)0097, Brussels, Art. 36-38. 
50 Lan, op.cit., p. 138. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Tubilewicz, ’op.cit., p. 428. 
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Taiwan’s profile through written questions […] and the right to obtain an answer from 
the Commission”.53 
One explanation for the EP’s continuous pro-Taiwan activism is the existence of a 
powerful Taiwan lobby among MEPs, the so-called EP-Taiwan Friendship Group 
founded by Viviane Reding and other MEPs in 1991. This grouping has been a driving 
force behind most of the EP’s seminal initiatives to expand quasi-political relations 
with Taiwan during the late 1990s and early 2000s.54 Despite this impressive past 
record, the EP-Taiwan Friendship Group’s activeness and degree of organisation 
should not be over-estimated:  
Yes, there is interest in Taiwan [...] but the Taiwan issue politically really is nothing 
to write home about, it is more of a hobby for parliamentarians, which is also why 
MEPs restrict themselves.55 
Most importantly, membership of the group is very informal and not even the MEPs in 
leading positions publicly declare their membership in the group on their own 
websites.56 The fact that finding out the names of even the most active MEPs in the 
group required sedulous research and personal contacts within the Parliament 
speaks volumes about the nature of this ‘Taiwan lobby’. Asked about the specific 
implications of adhering to the group, a TRO diplomat in Brussels mainly referred to 
invitations to social events organised by the Taiwanese delegation, and the 
possibility of regular delegation visits to Taiwan.57 While such visits are also common 
for other partner countries, Taiwan’s ‘invitation diplomacy’ beats all records, with up 
to three trips to Taiwan per year and the generous extension of invitations to 
parliamentary assistants.58 The latter are, in fact, rightly considered another important 
lobbying target by Taiwanese officials, both through their important agenda-setting 
function for MEPs and because they often ensure continuity between legislatures, by 
‘hopping’ from one MEP to another within political groups and thus increasing and 
solidifying the pro-Taiwan network. 
53 Parliamentary assistant INTA Committee (Interview 4); author’s translation. 
54 Lan, op.cit., pp. 135-137. 
55 Parliamentary assistant (Interview 7); author’s translation. 
56 This informality is not only due to Chinese pressure, but has also the advantage of liberating 
EP-Taiwan relations from the formal constraints of the One-China policy and allowing for 
informal contacts at all levels (see Interview 7). 
57 Interview with a Taiwanese diplomat, TRO, European Parliament division, Brussels, 20 April 
2015. 
58 Parliamentary assistant INTA (Interview 4); Parliamentary assistant (Interview 7). 
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The large number of group members (over 200 MEPs during the last legislature, 
according to the TRO) also suggests that the wider circle of members is hardly more 
than a mailing list with parliamentarians potentially sympathetic to Taiwan’s interests. 
When it comes down to major lobbying interests such as the drafting of EP reports 
and resolutions, or even the quest for an economic agreement, MEPs will be 
targeted no matter whether they are members of the group or not. Conversely, 
close cooperation or even confidentiality is impossible within such a large and loose 
group, and relies much more on individual personal contacts and good relationships 
with individual assistants: “Taiwan’s priority is keeping the contacts, always keep 
channels open for dialogue [...] anyway you get nowhere with aggressive lobbying 
in the Parliament.”59 
Although a purely symbolic foreign policy instrument, supportive EP resolutions 
remain important diplomatic victories for Taiwan at each time, and TRO officials 
themselves spontaneously referred to the number of resolutions passed by the EP 
over time as an indicator for Taiwan’s standing in EU foreign policy-making.60 
However, if this is to be made a gauge for Taiwan’s lobbying success, the prospects 
seem bleak. In fact, the number of resolutions dedicated to Taiwan has been in 
decline since the early 2000s, when the EP had made it a sport to express its support 
for the democratising Taiwan and denounce Chinese provocations.61 Even a TRO 
diplomat acknowledged that 
it has become hard for the European Parliament in recent years to pass 
resolutions with special reference to Taiwan, [therefore] our main goal is now to 
include [...] references to Taiwan [...] in other resolutions and see to it that, for 
example, the cross-Strait chapter in resolutions on China or East Asia is more [...] 
friendly to our position.62 
 Non-institutional actors as alternative channels of influence? 
Apart from institutional channels of influence, advocacy and lobbying also need to 
account for public pressure on political decision-makers. As the vast academic 
literature on ‘outside lobbying’ has shown, raising the political salience of issues by 
attracting widespread media attention is an important factor of lobbying success, 
59 Parliamentary assistant (Interview 7, author’s translation). 
60 Taiwanese diplomat, EP division (Interview 6). 
61 Tang, op.cit., p. 36. 
62 Taiwanese diplomat, EP division (Interview 6). 
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not only in the EU.63 Attracting the attention of the European mass media is, of 
course, a difficult endeavour for most small-sized countries. It is an even more 
arduous task for Taiwan, which desperately needs international attention for its cause 
yet is increasingly overshadowed by the ‘China hype’ in Western public discourse.64 
The problem of being marginalised in European public discourse is certainly not 
new for Taiwan.65 But while the restrictive European policies towards Taiwan, such as 
repeated refusals by EU member states to grant visas (even to Taiwanese politicians 
invited by the EP in the early 2000s66) may have passed largely unnoticed, the 
Taiwan question did remain on the public agenda as an important international 
flashpoint due to the repeated public stand-offs between Taipei and Beijing.  
In order to illustrate Taiwan’s more recent role in the European public discourse, 
an analysis of news coverage in major quality newspapers of four European 
countries over the last 12 months is presented below.67 
 
 
63 See among others Mahoney, op.cit., p. 43. 
64 G. Rawnsley, “Taiwan’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy”, Journal of Current Chinese 
Affairs, vol. 43, no. 3, 2014, p. 164. 
65 Lan, op.cit., p. 136. 
66 Tubilewicz, op.cit., pp. 424-425. 
67 The analysis is based on the author’s own research in the publicly accessible online archives 
of Le Monde (France), Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany), The Telegraph (United Kingdom) and 
El País (Spain). From all news articles mentioning the keyword ‘Taiwan*’, those dealing directly 
with Taiwan-related issues were selected and grouped in six topics. 
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The results, although not representative for all European media coverage, clearly 
point to the blatant lack of attention to the Taiwan question in major European 
newspapers. In addition to the generally low number of articles on Taiwan, most of 
the news deal with natural disasters and plane crashes (28%), or relate to Taiwanese 
companies or society trends (24%), without even mentioning political issues. Political 
aspects, if present at all, are mostly covered from a mainland Chinese perspective 
and often concern territorial disputes in the South China Sea (25%). The Umbrella 
Movement in Hong Kong in autumn 2014 has also spawned some comparisons with 
the situation in Taiwan (10%). Taiwan’s foreign and cross-Strait relations, however, 
accounted for less than 6% of the news, showing that serious discussions of the 
Taiwan question are virtually absent from European media. The starkest contrast 
became obvious last year between the extensive coverage of Hong Kong’s 
‘Occupy Central’ movement against increased PRC interference, while Taiwan’s 
anti-ECFA Sunflower Movement, which brought much larger crowds to the streets 
over similar concerns, was only marginally noticed by the European public.68 
Furthermore, Taiwan is also confronted with the problem of a weak expatriate 
community in Europe, depriving it of strong civil society links.69 This contrasts sharply 
with the US, where a well-organised Taiwanese expatriate community boasts active 
civil society lobbying organisations such as the American Citizens for Taiwan, an 
organisation that “strives for a U.S. Government position on Taiwan that is fully 
supportive of Taiwan’s right to self-determination via referendum by all Taiwanese 
without external threat or interference”.70 Generally speaking, the use of civil society 
actors’ transnational links has emerged as an important flank of Taiwan’s ‘total 
diplomacy’ which, starting from the 1990s, was designed to reap “the fruits of social 
and political liberalization”.71 
In Europe, however, Taiwanese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are 
barely represented and neither Taiwanese diplomats nor their European 
counterparts were able to name any politically relevant civil society actors in 
personal interviews. The only NGO mentioned by a TRO interviewee was the Fo-
Guang Shan Buddhist Organisation, which indeed is represented and active across 
68 D. Pilling, “Taiwan resolves to resist China’s embrace”, Financial Times, 5 November 2014. 
69 Cabestan, op.cit., pp. 97-99. 
70 American Citizens for Taiwan, “We are ACT”, http://americancitizensfortaiwan.org. 
71 Chen, op.cit., p. 223. 
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Europe, with temples and representative offices in nine EU countries.72 But as the 
diplomat conceded himself, “this is more of a general nature, it’s about the 
improvement of Taiwan’s cultural image [...] they are not a lobby organisation”.73 
The only pro-Taiwan civil society organisation that is able to attract at least some 
public attention is the Danish NGO Taiwan Corner, which seeks to “defend Taiwan’s 
democracy” and support Taiwan’s “membership of all international organisations” as 
well as its “right to self-determination”.74 Whereas Taiwan Corner possesses good 
contacts within the EP and promotes Taiwanese interests through Europe-wide 
conferences and opinion articles, it is hardly a ‘second-track’ tool of KMT diplomacy, 
given the largely divergent views on how to represent Taiwan abroad and the lack 
of any formal exchange with TROs in Brussels or elsewhere. As other pro-Taiwan 
actors, however, it is also confronted with the difficulty of attracting the European 
media’s attention to Taiwan-related issues.75 
In addition to civil society, business lobbying organisations do play a limited role 
as well. Both the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce in Europe and the European 
Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan (ECCT) coordinate and organise activities such as 
conferences and delegation visits jointly with Taiwan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry and the 
TRO.76 Concerning the quest for improved EU-Taiwan commercial and investment 
ties, and in particular the more modest idea of a Bilateral Investment Agreement 
(BIA), the European corporate lobby group BusinessEurope is another partner with 
excellent connections in all EU institutions, from which the Taiwanese side can, to 
some extent, ‘borrow influence’. The effectiveness of this additional channel may, 
however, be hampered by a Taiwanese lack of understanding for the specific 
business structures in many European countries. In an approach that mirrors lobbying 
in the US, mainly large companies are targeted which may lead Taiwanese 
diplomats to neglect the fundamental importance of small and medium-sized 
European companies. The latter are mostly unaware of Taiwan’s potential but could 
be an important untapped source of influence. 
72 See Fo Guang Shan Monastery, “Worldwide/Europe”, https://www.fgs.org.tw/en/ 
worldwide/Europe. 
73 Interview with a Taiwanese diplomat, TRO, political division, Brussels, 20 April 2015. 
74 See Taiwan Corner, “About us”, http://taiwancorner.org/?page_id=92. 
75 Interview with the director of Taiwan Corner, via video call, 15 March 2015. 
76 Taiwanese diplomat, political division (Interview 5). 
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Besides the mass media and civil society, the production of favourable 
‘expertise’ is another potentially important channel of influence through which 
decision-makers can be indirectly reached and sensitised for a specific political 
cause. The particular relevance of expertise-based lobbying for decision-making at 
the European level makes an examination of academic and think tank research all 
the more important for understanding Taiwanese lobbying in Europe.77 
Despite the establishment of a European Association for Taiwan Studies (EATS) in 
2004 and a few Taiwan research centres in London, Tübingen and Vienna, European 
Taiwan research still lags far behind the prolific – and mostly sympathetic – 
academic expertise on the island in the US.78 Financial and political support for 
academic exchange and Taiwan-related research has thus become a constant 
feature of Taiwanese ‘track-two diplomacy’ in Europe. Formally non-governmental 
foundations such as the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation (in 1989) or the Taiwan 
Foundation for Democracy (in 2003) have been set up by successive governments to 
generously fund academic activities and research institutes abroad. However, as in 
the reckless race for development aid in Africa and Latin America, Taiwanese 
funding is increasingly insignificant compared to a gargantuan Chinese ‘soft power 
crusade’, including the very generous – but not unconditional – funding for 
Confucius Institutes to be established at European universities. As Shambaugh has 
demonstrated, the Confucius Institutes are part of a larger Chinese ‘soft power’ 
apparatus bound to the goals of “countering Taiwan independence proclivities” 
and “propagating China’s foreign policy”.79 This translates not only into the 
suppression of critical debates over the Taiwan question as such, but also into an 
aggressive strategy to force back Taiwanese influence in Europe. For example, the 
European Association for Chinese Studies has recently criticised Chinese interference 
and censorship of content provided for an academic conference by the Chiang 
Ching-kuo Foundation in Portugal.80 Taiwan Corner also reported severe difficulties 
77 C. Robert & A. Vauchez, “L’Académie européenne. Savoirs, experts et savants dans le 
gouvernement de l’Europe”, Politix, vol. 23, no. 89, 2010, pp. 9–34. 
78 See among others: S. Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse, 
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. 
79 D. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy”, The 
China Journal, vol. 57, 2007, pp. 48-49. 
80 European Association for Chinese Studies, “Letter of Protest at Interference in EACS 
Conference in Portugal, July 2014”, 1 August 2014. 
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when looking for a Danish university willing to host an EATS conference due to 
Chinese pressure and conditional funding arrangements.81 
Faced with this threat of being completely absorbed by China’s embrace of 
Europe, Taipei has launched a counter-offensive in ‘academic soft diplomacy’ by 
founding the Taiwan Academy in 2011 as a “tool to promote Taiwanese-flavored 
Mandarin and traditional Chinese characters, and also sponsor research on Taiwan-
related topics”.82 While activities organised by the contact points of the Taiwan 
Academy at European universities mostly comply with the KMT’s ‘apolitical’ cultural 
diplomacy strategy, the emphasis on Taiwan’s linguistic, cultural and political 
distinctiveness – traditionally an exclusive DPP domain – is an unequivocal signal that 
even the conciliatory KMT government has taken up the gauntlet and entered into 
the game of ‘soft power competition’ for the hearts and minds of Europeans. 
Finally, concerning the research activities of Brussels-based think tanks, it is 
difficult to assess the actual degree of Taiwanese interference or ‘stimulus’. In any 
case, the recent increase in studies and policy papers defending the economic 
importance and feasibility of an EU-Taiwan ECA has been remarkable.83 These 
reports generally focus on expected economic gains for both sides and, more 
recently, highlight the additional chances for European businesses created by the 
ECFA, thus amplifying the Taiwanese government’s narrative portraying Taiwan as a 
promising hub for the Chinese market.84 Financial support for such studies may not 
only come from Taiwanese para-governmental foundations, but also from the EETO 
and the ECCT, which have long been in favour of intensified EU-Taiwan trade 
relations. Conversely, the TRO in Brussels tends to rely on a more reactive and 
targeted approach, by establishing closer relationships with authors having already 
published articles sympathetic to Taiwan’s cause.85 Although the increasingly audible 
81 Head of Taiwan Corner (Interview 2). 
82 A. Poon, “Soft Power Smackdown! Confucius Institute vs. Taiwan Academy”, Wall Street 
Journal, 12 August 2011. 
83 See among others, F. Erixon, M. Krol & N. Macyra, “After cross-Strait rapprochement: A 
conceptual analysis of potential gains to Europe from China-Taiwan economic cooperation”, 
European Centre for International Political Economy, ECIPE Occasional Paper, no. 3, Brussels, 
2012; Y. Tseng, “Challenges and opportunities of a EU-Taiwan ECA: A review of political-
economic perspectives”, Center for Asian Studies, Asie Visions, no. 56, Paris/Brussels, 
November 2012; P. Messerlin, “The EU Preferential Trade Agreements: Defining Priorities for a 
Debt-Ridden, Growth-Starving EU”, GEM Working Paper, Paris, Sciences Po, Groupe 
d’Économie Mondiale, January 2012. 
84 See Tseng, op.cit., pp. 14-15. 
85 Interview with an official, European Parliament, via video call, 26 April 2015. 
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(para-)academic calls for an ambitious EU-Taiwan trade agreement have not (yet?) 
had any tangible impact on the Commission’s position, they certainly reinforce the 
standing of pro-Taiwan actors in Brussels. The EP’s own research services constitute 
another connecting link through which these reports are made accessible to MEPs,86 
with Commission/EEAS officials equally aware of these arguments.87 
Keeping politics out: a successful strategy for deepening EU-Taiwan ties? 
Following the above examination of Taiwan’s different channels of influence and 
their severe limitations in Europe, this section will question the highly economistic 
strategy currently embraced by both the Commission/EEAS and the TRO, based on 
the case of the Taiwanese attempts to negotiate and conclude an ECA, or at least a 
BIA, with the EU. 
 ‘Economistic pragmatism’ as the best way to lobby Europe? 
After an over-politicisation of EU-Taiwan relations, especially during the last two years 
of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, the new KMT government under president Ma 
clearly emphasised the importance of a more pragmatic diplomacy and designed a 
new EU policy that “aims to use détente in the Strait to strengthen Taiwan’s 
functional relations with the EU and promote Taiwan’s economic interests without 
raising any political issues”.88 To be sure, the KMT could not completely ban political 
aspects from its relations with the EU. In fact, the visa waiver agreement remained a 
priority issue for Taiwanese lobbying in the first years of Ma’s presidency, and its 
conclusion in 2010 represents the only major success story showing how 
comprehensive Taiwanese lobbying can work in the EU in recent years. A concerted 
Taiwanese effort, starting with pro-Taiwanese MEPs in the EP-Taiwan Friendship Group 
and simultaneously involving Commission officials and China desk officers in the 
member states was necessary to obtain this seminal diplomatic concession.89 
While current lobbying activities show how Taiwan is trying to build on this with a 
concerted effort at both the EU and national level, the focus has clearly shifted 
86 See M. Latek, “EU-Taiwan Trade Relations”, European Parliament, Library Briefing, 3 October 
2013; M. Armanovica, “Taiwan. The risk of marginalisation. Economic situation and trade 
relations with the EU”, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the 
Union, Policy Briefing, October 2013. 
87 EEAS official (Interview 3). 
88 Su, op.cit., p. 108. 
89 Ibid. 
21 
                                                 
EU Diplomacy Paper 8/2015 
towards intensified trade and investment relations. Taiwan’s overall interest in getting 
as close as possible to a comprehensive FTA with the EU would probably have been 
perceived by any government, be it DPP or KMT.90 But the way in which the KMT 
administration is pursuing this interest in Brussels is quite symptomatic for its new 
economistic pragmatism in dealing with Europe. 
Based on incrementalism, Taiwan has started to rely on what its government calls 
a “block-building strategy”.91 According to a lobbying paper of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, “working groups on issues such as […] IPR [intellectual property 
rights], pharmaceuticals, and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures”92 will help 
to intensify contacts with the European side through regular videoconferences. This is 
apparently based on the hope that the technical ‘building blocks’ will eventually 
convince European bureaucrats that Taiwan is a partner to be trusted with a more 
comprehensive ECA. By relying on purely economic arguments in favour of an 
ECA,93 the Taiwanese side mirrors the Commission’s criteria for opening FTA 
negotiations, and the expected economic gains do indeed support the Taiwanese 
bid.94 The fact that the Ma administration mainly portrays Taiwan as a promising 
regional hub for European investors in East Asia, and particularly as an access point 
to the Chinese market,95 also shows that another KMT rationale behind concluding 
the ECFA with China in 2010 was to make Taiwan economically relevant again – an 
argument that has been echoed by pro-Taiwanese forces in Europe: 
[E]conomic integration with mainland China, in the framework of the ECFA, would 
offer preferential access to the Chinese market to EU producers in Taiwan. This 
could be seen as an alternative to a direct EU FTA with China, which is not seen as 
a likely prospect in the short or medium term.96  
However, due to the significant improvement of EU-China bilateral relations, as well 
as China’s own substantial reforms within the WTO system, doubts are being cast on 
90 Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan, “Progress in launching and signing of FTAs between 
Taiwan and its primary trading partners”, Strategy paper, 7 January 2013. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., p. 6. 
93 This reliance on purely economic and trade-related arguments goes beyond official 
discourse, as personal interviews at the TRO and the EEAS confirmed. 
94 Armanovica, op.cit., pp. 18-19. 
95 M. Okano-Heijmans, S. Wit & F. van der Putten, Cross-Strait Relations and Trade Diplomacy 
in East Asia. Towards Greater EU-Taiwan Economic Cooperation?, Clingendael Report, The 
Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2015, pp. 41-42. 
96 Latek, op.cit., p. 1 (emphasis added). 
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Taiwan’s relevance as an access point to China for Europe. Even an EP official 
sympathetic to Taiwan described its ‘hub function’ as far less pertinent than before,97 
and Commission officials even tend to be somewhat exasperated about this 
“Taiwanese mantra”.98 Such European scepticism indicates that improving cross-
Strait relations and down-tuning potentially annoying demands for recognition does 
not automatically increase the effectiveness of Taiwanese lobbying in the 
commercial domain. 
 Taiwan’s initial wish for a comprehensive FTA, similar to the EU-Korea or EU-
Singapore FTAs, has been flatly rejected by all EU actors, which shows that none of 
Taiwan’s channels of influence is strong enough to make up for its particular 
diplomatic predicament. Staying true to its diplomatic pragmatism, Taiwan quickly 
scrapped the FTA idea as unrealistic and replaced it with the more flexible notion of 
an ECA.99 The EP’s repeated support for this option demonstrated that the EP-Taiwan 
Friendship Group is still a viable channel of influence.100 However, any agreement 
that would privilege the EU’s relations with Taiwan over EU-China relations hardly 
enjoys any support beyond the EP, which is why the TRO has further retreated 
towards a more limited BIA in lockstep with the proposed EU-China Bilateral 
Investment Treaty: 
Taiwan’s initial ambition was to have a comprehensive FTA or Economic 
Cooperation Agreement, but the EU responded that this would be a very long 
process and only a Bilateral Investment Agreement might be possible [...] Taiwan 
therefore regards the BIA as a stepping stone to an FTA.101 
But even in this regard, European diplomats continue to play for time: “We would 
support the idea of it, but negotiations have not been opened so far [...] this is not an 
issue that will be resolved very soon.”102 By exploring the reasons for this pointed 
reserve, the next section will bring out some major shortcomings of Taiwan’s current 
depoliticised lobbying style. 
97 EP official (Interview 8). 
98 Okano-Heijmans, Wit & van der Putten, op.cit., p. 49. 
99 Despite being more flexible in nature than an FTA, such an agreement would still need to 
be comprehensive enough to comply with WTO rules for RTA. 
100 European Parliament, Resolution of 9 October 2013 on EU-Taiwan trade relations 
(2013/2675(RSP)), P7_TA(2013)0412, Brussels. 
101 Taiwanese diplomat, political division (Interview 5). 
102 EEAS official (Interview 3). 
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 The hidden geopolitics behind the EU’s economic façade 
Apart from the general fact that commercial policy is the main source of 
Commission power in foreign relations,103 focussing on bilateral trade in relations with 
Taiwan has had other obvious advantages for the European side: first, the main EU 
interests vis-à-vis Taiwan concern technical barriers to trade and other commercial 
issues, including the European wish that Taiwan “eliminate overregulation”, “comply 
with WTO commitments” and “accelerate the development of the service 
industry”.104 More broadly, the EU’s self-perceived interests in East Asia are of a mainly 
economic nature, which is why European actors cautiously refrain from touching 
upon any sensitive geopolitical issues. Under these circumstances, bilateral trade has 
been a practical tool for maintaining relatively close relations with Taiwan without 
the requirement of formal diplomatic ties. 
However, separating international commerce and geopolitics has always been 
tricky in reality. Due to what has been dubbed the “new bilateralism”105 or 
plurilateralism in global trade policy, this artificial separation is now rapidly becoming 
even more fragile. The multilateral framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), and even more so the binding dispute settlement mechanisms of 
the WTO, have made it possible to depoliticise bilateral trade relations between 
members to a significant extent. Nevertheless, hopes that negotiations about further 
trade concessions and new rules of international commerce may equally be 
conducted primarily in a consensus-based multilateral framework have been 
dampened by the failures of the Doha Round. 
Despite the PRC’s shrewd use of competitive liberalisation to further isolate 
Taiwan and eventually make cross-Strait integration the only viable option, there is 
no compelling reason why Taiwan, as a full member of the WTO, should not be 
equally entitled to conclude RTAs under WTO law. Economic reasons for its failure to 
do so – beyond two FTAs with Singapore and New Zealand – can be ruled out as 
Taiwan’s standards for investment protection or government procurement are far 
more advanced than in many competing economies.106 By refusing to even open 
103 Keukeleire & Delreux, op.cit., p. 73. 
104 F. Laursen, “The Politics and Economics of EU-China/Taiwan Relations. A European 
Perspective”, Dalhousie University, EUCE Occasional Paper, no. 1, 2006, p. 22. 
105 J. Ravenhill, “The new bilateralism in the Asia Pacific”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2, 
2003, pp. 299-317. 
106 Erixon, Krol & Macyra, op.cit., p. 5. 
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negotiations, other WTO members, including the EU, thus clearly display obedience 
to Chinese pressure that goes beyond the requirements of the One-China policy. 
As for the EU institutions, another far more mundane yet potentially even more 
important impediment than the fear of Chinese reprisals may be different priority 
setting, particularly in light of the all-engulfing Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).107 This holds true for the Commission as well as the EP’s International 
Trade (INTA) Committee, where “Taiwan is not often mentioned now [... and] 
priorities lie elsewhere”.108 The TTIP, however, is also a good example of how 
important domestic constituencies have become in international trade negotiations. 
Whereas civil society activism regarding TTIP is generally rather hostile, transatlantic 
business lobbies are playing a major and decisive role in pushing for a far-reaching 
EU-US FTA.109 In contrast, the pro-Taiwan business lobby in Europe is simply too weak 
and the Taiwanese seem unable to strengthen this channel of influence which would 
be vital in convincing the Commission of the merits of a trade agreement with 
Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s lack of lobbying success despite some convincing economic 
arguments shows that the KMT’s strategy of ‘economistic pragmatism’ may have 
fallen into the trap of taking the Commission’s technical discourse on trade 
agreements too seriously, thereby neglecting other, unarticulated constraints. 
Rawnsley has recently argued that by relying purely on benign themes such as 
culture and mutual economic benefit, Taiwan is giving up the ‘soft power’ potential 
of “more appealing but also more incendiary themes such as democracy”.110 While 
defending Taiwan’s democracy may never have been an important concern for the 
Commission, it definitely was for the EP in the early 2000s. But even in this regard, 
normative issues play a minor role today: “Today, democracy [...] values [...] are not 
seen as an important argument for intensifying trade.”111 The weakness of external 
pressure on the Commission to treat Taiwan at least as favourably as other, less 
democratic countries with similar expected liberalisation benefits in its global RTA 
strategy now turns out to be a massive problem for Taiwan and confirms that even 
107 EP official (Interview 8); Parliamentary assistant INTA Committee (Interview 4). 
108 Parliamentary assistant INTA Committee (Interview 4). 
109 A. Dür & L. Lechner, “Business Interests and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership”, in J. Morin et al. (eds.), The Politics of Transatlantic Trade Negotiations: TTIP in a 
Globalized World, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 69-80. 
110 Rawnsley, op.cit., p. 165. 
111 EP official (Interview 8). 
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within the supposedly expertise-based EU bureaucracy, trade relations cannot be 
separated from political considerations. 
 The ‘China factor’ and the potential for a different EU Taiwan policy 
Given that a stand-alone EU Taiwan policy without consideration for China is 
unthinkable, actors from both the European and Taiwanese side will have to reflect 
upon the chances of obtaining China’s consent to a potential upgrade of EU-Taiwan 
trade relations. As EU-China relations have been intensified and institutionalised over 
the last decade, it might be expected that the Chinese attitude would also become 
more lenient in this regard. However, the opposite is true, judging by the most recent 
Chinese policy paper on the EU, where Beijing recalls that the “Taiwan question 
concerns China’s core interests” and unambiguously formulates its requests:  
- Exchanges between the EU and its member states and Taiwan should be strictly 
limited to nonofficial and people-to-people activities. Political figures of Taiwan 
should not be allowed to visit the EU or its member states under any pretext, and 
the EU and its member states should refrain from having any form of official 
exchanges or signing any official agreements with the Taiwan authorities. 
- China asks the EU and its member states not to support Taiwan’s accession to 
any international organization whose membership requires statehood.112 
Apart from the very harsh, commanding tone of this paragraph, which stands in stark 
contrast to policy paper’s honeyed win-win rhetoric, the ‘prohibition’ of any official 
agreement with Taiwan is particularly surprising in light of China’s seemingly 
complaisant acceptance of Taiwan’s FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore.113 
Why has China hardened its stance towards the EU, despite the significant 
improvement of cross-Strait relations compared to 2003? For one, the relative 
lenience in other cases may be explained by the fact that both New Zealand and 
Singapore already had concluded previous FTAs with China, so that Taiwan did not 
get any preferential treatment in comparison. The EU may also be seen as 
symbolically more important, especially after its visa waiver agreement with Taiwan 
112 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “China’s Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-
EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation”, 2 April 
2014 (emphasis added). 
113 “Commenting on the Taiwan-Singapore pact, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said 
Beijing had ‘no questions on foreign countries undertaking economic, trade and cultural 
relations with Taiwan’.” (A. Fensom, “Taiwan-Singapore FTA”, The Diplomat, 8 November 
2013). 
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provoked a remarkable domino effect across the globe.114 But the Chinese side also 
appears to have understood that the EU’s normative foreign policy can be 
effectively curtailed by a tough and menacing stance combined with carrots and 
sticks for individual member states, as the successful strategy against official visits of 
the Dalai Lama to Europe has equally shown. 
EU support for Taiwan as a ‘like-minded’ democracy – although in accordance 
with the EU’s value-based foreign policy approach – would undoubtedly be 
interpreted by the PRC in terms of an ‘offensive normative approach’, similar to 
public human rights criticism or interference with the Tibet or Xinjiang questions. This 
kind of normative approach, however, has lost any effectiveness vis-à-vis China due 
to the “loss of moral high ground, conflicting EU interests and lack of leverage”.115 
However, if the EU does not want to drop its value-based foreign policy in East Asia 
altogether, alternatives need to be found. A “defensive normative approach”,116 as 
advocated by Mattlin, would mean that while Europeans refrain from imposing their 
version of liberal democracy on China, 
[…] neither can China decree, for example, who European leaders meet on their 
home turf or how we should organize our internal affairs. [Such a] more realist-
tinged normative policy would be far more understandable to Beijing.117 
As regards the Taiwan question, such an approach might include not only formalised 
preferential trade relations within the WTO framework, but also more openly assumed 
contacts with Taiwan’s government and opposition. While Beijing would probably 
not take kindly to such an EU approach either, it is clear that possible diplomatic 
pressure or even the threat of sanctions is far more difficult for China as long as such 
initiatives remain limited to the EU level with only tacit support from the member 
states. In return, closer economic relations with Taiwan might even represent an 
additional bargaining chip in the EU’s hands when negotiating future commercial 
agreements with China. 
Thus, Taiwan’s only hope for improving its standing in Europe rests upon decisions 
at the EU level. A further Europeanisation of foreign policy in general might therefore 
play out in Taiwan’s favour, in particular insofar as it implies an increased role for the 
114 Su, op.cit., p. 110. 
115 Mattlin, op.cit., p. 9. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., p. 21. 
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Taiwan-friendly EP. Whereas Taiwanese diplomats themselves do not see the Lisbon 
Treaty as having brought about any significant changes,118 the EP’s role has in reality 
been substantially upgraded through the expansion of its co-decision power to the 
conclusion of international agreements. In this sense, the EP could theoretically even 
make the conclusion of an EU-China BIT conditional upon a similar or more far-
reaching agreement with Taiwan. For now, however, the Taiwanese diplomatic 
apparatus does not seem to have grasped the full potential of these new powers of 
its closest ally in Europe. 
Conclusions 
By combining the empirical scrutiny of Taiwan’s channels of influence in Brussels with 
a theoretical analysis of the EU’s foreign and commercial policy in East Asia, this 
paper has shown that the Kuomintang administration’s pragmatic ‘workable 
diplomacy’ approach, while smoothing out working-level relations between Taiwan 
and the EU, fails to attract a sufficient degree of political and public attention in 
Europe to the Taiwan question. Increasing the salience of the Taiwan issue in 
European foreign policy, however, would be all the more crucial today in light of the 
overwhelming economic importance of mainland China. 
At first sight, the larger picture of Taiwan’s channels of influence in Europe has 
not radically changed following the handover of power in 2008. Without any doubt, 
the KMT’s pursuit of better cross-Strait relations is warmly welcomed by most 
European policy-makers, who see them as a precondition for closer ties with 
Taiwan.119 However, better relations with China have not unambiguously helped the 
Taiwanese government to improve its standing abroad.120 Beijing’s diplomatic 
pressure has not softened and European policy-makers have so far shown no 
willingness to reward Taiwan’s accommodating spirit with a substantial upgrade of 
bilateral relations. 
Despite the professionalism and activeness with which Taiwanese diplomats 
manage to maintain various functional channels of influence in Brussels, Taiwan’s 
relations with the EU remain precarious in many regards. The Council, the European 
Commission and the EEAS strictly avoid any potential infringement of the One-China 
118 Taiwanese diplomat, EP division (Interview 6). 
119 EEAS official (Interview 3); EIAS Taiwan expert (Interview 1). 
120 Rawnsley, op.cit., p. 161. 
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policy. The EP can still be accurately described as Taiwan’s strongest channel of 
influence in Europe, despite the EP-Taiwan Friendship Group being less active today 
than ten years ago. An examination of both national governments’ official stances 
and negotiating positions in Brussels equally suggests relative continuity, apart from 
the tendency of crisis-stricken European countries to become even more susceptible 
to China’s political requests.121 
Regarding a potential EU-Taiwan trade agreement, the constraints imposed on 
EU-Taiwan relations by the ‘China factor’, important as they may be, do not per se 
preclude an upgrade of Taiwan’s partnership with the EU. However, despite very 
active Taiwanese lobbying of all relevant actors in Brussels, the Commission and the 
EEAS remain hesitant to take any initiative in this regard. Interestingly enough, this 
passivity cannot simply be attributed to daunting threats from Beijing, but is 
explained, even from within the Parliament, by other priorities for DG Trade – notably 
the TTIP. The challenge for Taiwan, thus, is not simply one of convincing through 
technical arguments or of competing with Chinese lobbying, but one of agenda 
setting, that is, redefining European priorities in Taiwan’s favour. In this regard, 
however, the complete lack of public attention to Taiwan’s political predicament 
caused by the proliferation of RTAs in its environs is disastrous. It reveals the 
shortcomings of the accommodating and low-key ‘workable diplomacy’ strategy 
that currently characterises Taipei’s foreign policy and lobbying in Europe. In this 
sense, the DPP’s provocative lobbying style may have been difficult to deal with for 
European policy-makers and certainly destroyed a lot of political capital even 
among Taiwan’s closest friends in the EP, but it did manage to keep the Taiwan 
question on the European foreign policy radar. Ironically, the conciliatory ‘workable 
diplomacy’, while being welcomed by European foreign policy-makers, has reduced 
Taiwan’s leverage in other ways, notably by giving the – highly questionable – 
impression that the Taiwan Strait is no longer a dangerous flashpoint122 to worry 
about. 
This dilemma also highlights the often under-estimated relevance of extra-
institutional lobbying channels. In fact, both the simmering attention given to 
Taiwanese politics by the European media and the lack of any solid civil society 
121 See J. Fox & F. Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, London, ECFR, 2009, pp. 
19-31. 
122 Pilling, op. cit. 
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network which might help to articulate and advocate Taiwan’s interests in Europe 
are important limitations to the success of Taiwanese lobbying, all the more as its 
particular diplomatic quagmire makes these alternative diplomacy tracks more 
crucial for Taiwan than for any other sovereign nation. The positive attitudes of 
several European think tanks towards an EU-Taiwan FTA suggest that building a more 
integrated and favourable epistemic community around EU-Taiwan relations is one 
of the more functional elements of Taiwanese ‘track-two diplomacy’, although 
Chinese competition and interference also extend more and more to the academic 
sphere. 
Meanwhile, the KMT is confronted with the double problem of having to abstain 
from public advocacy of highly political issues itself, while also being unable to 
harness civil society support to obtain more visibility and leverage, given that civil 
society mobilisations in Taiwan today are predominantly directed against the KMT’s 
core foreign policy strategy of deepening ties with China. Nonetheless, the Sunflower 
Movement is far from irrelevant for the prospects of Taiwanese representation 
abroad. Regarding the implications and perspectives of further cross-Strait 
rapprochement, Pilling noted that “Beijing’s plan to lure Taiwan into its embrace risks 
backfiring”123 because of increasingly hostile popular sentiments against the seamy 
side of economic integration with China. In fact, the KMT might very well be ousted 
in early 2016 precisely for being too conciliatory towards the PRC, despite the 
benefits of improved cultural ties and new economic opportunities for Taiwanese 
companies on the mainland. Even if the current DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen cannot be 
expected to return to the provocative diplomacy style of the Chen era, Taiwanese 
lobbying in Europe could then be expected to change, possibly making it more 
difficult for the EU to maintain its ‘hands-off approach’ to the Taiwan question and 
eventually forcing it to develop a distinctively European approach to cross-Strait 
relations – be it normative or purely interest-based. 
123 Ibid. 
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